Abstract:
This comprehensive research article delves into the intricate interplay of demographic shifts, sectarian violence, and Shia phobia in Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B) from the perspective of human rights scholars. Historically, G-B was characterized by its Shia-majority population, constituting approximately 80% of its residents. However, over the past few decades, a confluence of factors, including the presence of radical Deobandi anti-Shia extremists, the influx of non-Kashmiris, and the insidious phenomenon of Shia phobia, has drastically transformed the region’s demographics. This scholarly exploration provides a meticulous examination of these changes and their profound implications for human rights.
Introduction:
Gilgit-Baltistan, nestled in the Himalayas, once represented a rich tapestry of cultural diversity with a Shia-majority populace. This community comprised roughly 80% of its inhabitants, reflecting the region’s historical heritage. However, the pages of history and contemporary events narrate a somber tale of demographic change driven by sectarian violence, further compounded by the involvement of radical Deobandi anti-Shia extremists, and the migration of non-Kashmiris. This scholarly analysis endeavors to delve into the multi-dimensional factors underpinning this transformation, devoid of blame attribution to the Pakistani government for genocide.
Historical Roots:
To genuinely grasp the present demographic mosaic in G-B, it is imperative to traverse the annals of history. Before the tumultuous partition of British India in 1947, G-B was an integral part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. It boasted a Shia majority, marking an era of stability and coexistence. However, the echoes of partition disrupted this equilibrium.
The Gilgit Massacre of 1988
One of the most tragic chapters in G-B’s history, ‘The Gilgit Massacre’ of 1988, casts a long shadow over our analysis. It was a period characterized by relentless violence, orchestrated by radical Deobandi jihadists, allegedly supported by elements within the Pakistani military and the Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs. This wave of violence, spanning 16 harrowing days, claimed hundreds of lives, razed numerous villages, and left an indelible mark on the region, marked by the deplorable molestation of women. This traumatic event inflicted lasting scars upon the cultural tapestry
Sectarian Violence as a Tool of Shia Phobia:
Sectarian violence, often orchestrated by radical Deobandi elements, serves as a potent weapon in the arsenal of Shia phobia. The deliberate targeting of Shia Muslims, their places of worship, and their sacred rituals reflects not only a deep-seated prejudice but also a calculated effort to marginalize and intimidate this community. Such violence perpetuates an atmosphere of fear, rendering Shias vulnerable to persecution.
Shia Phobia in Gilgit-Baltistan:
In Gilgit-Baltistan, the very heart of this issue, Shia phobia has taken root over the years. The Shia population, once a majority, now finds itself grappling with a climate of fear and persecution. Radical Deobandi elements, emboldened by a misguided extremist ideology, have actively propagated anti-Shia sentiments. The consequences have been dire, with sectarian violence and discrimination driving a wedge through this once-diverse and harmonious region.
The State of Shia Muslims in Pakistan:
The phenomenon of Shia phobia is not confined to Gilgit-Baltistan alone; it extends its ominous reach throughout Pakistan. Shia Muslims across the country face persistent threats to their lives, livelihoods, and basic freedoms. Radical Deobandi extremists, with their virulent anti-Shia ideology, continue to perpetrate acts of violence and discrimination, leaving the Shia community in a state of perpetual unease.
Challenges to Tolerance and Pluralism:
The prevalence of Shia phobia poses a grave challenge to the principles of tolerance and pluralism that are essential for a diverse nation like Pakistan. It undermines the very fabric of a society that should celebrate its rich tapestry of cultures, ethnicities, and religious beliefs. The radicalization of certain elements threatens the foundations of a harmonious coexistence among Pakistan’s diverse religious communities
The Need for Counteraction
Addressing Shia phobia requires a concerted effort from not only the government but also civil society, religious leaders, and international human rights organizations. Promoting dialogue, fostering interfaith harmony, and condemning hate speech and violence are vital steps toward countering this pervasive bias. By safeguarding the rights and dignity of Shia Muslims, Pakistan can reclaim its legacy as a land that values diversity and pluralism.
Gilgit-Baltistan and Ethnic Demographic Changes:
Beside the harrowing violence and sectarian tensions, another dimension of concern emerges – the manipulation of ethnic demographics. Post the 1980s, Sunni Muslims from hegemonic Pakistani provinces like Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa started infiltrating through business routes, gradually settling in the region. This influx of outsiders has not only depleted employment opportunities for the locals but has also intensified sectarian tensions. These newcomers have seized land, government jobs, and exploited the region’s natural resources, diverting development funds towards military deployments.
Terror Camps and Radicalization:
Terror camps openly supported by the Pakistani Army have bred hundreds of Sunni Jihadis, members of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), now operating throughout the region, targeting Shia Muslims.
Rebuttal of Foreign Involvement:
Despite Pakistani government claims of foreign involvement in the G-B riots, Inspector General of G-B, Hussain Asghar, firmly stated, “I don’t think there is any foreign hand involved in sectarian riots.
Ethnic Cleansing Beyond Sectarian Lines:
The study emphasizes that ethnic cleansing efforts are not confined to Shia Muslims alone; liberal Sunni Muslims have also fallen victim to the Pakistani government and military’s attempts to alter the demography of the region.
External Threats:
Concerns persist that G-B is under attack from the Waziristan region, serving as safe havens for jihadis, supported by Salafi elements within the Pakistan Army.
International Awareness
At the 13th session of the UN Human Rights Council, Abdul Hamid Khan of the Balwaristan National Front highlighted widespread human rights abuses in G-B, exacerbated by the absence of local media.
Deobandi Faith-Based Violence Against Shia Muslims in Gilgit-Baltistan:
Turning Swords into Plowshares
The first case of faith-based violence against Shia resulting in the loss of human life occurred in 1975, when the Shia Mourning procession in Gilgit town was fired at from the Deobandi Mosque. The subsequent arrest of the Deobandi Qazi (religious leader) caused riots in theDeobandi dominated a areas of the Indus valley, south of Gilgit, and its side valleys of Gor, Darel, and Tangir. Radical Deobandis from these regions threatened to attack Gilgi
In 1983, another significant episode of violence rooted in the Deobandi faith occurred. The Deobandi clerics, who held strong anti-Shia sentiments, exerted pressure on Shia Muslims residing in Gilgit-Baltistan to conform to their interpretation of the Moon sighting, which determined the conclusion of the month-long Ramadan fast and the commencement of Eid celebrations. During the Eid festivities, an extremist mob with anti-Shia sentiments launched violent attacks against Shia Muslims, resulting in numerous fatalities and injuries among the Shia community. The attacking mobs originated from the predominantly Deobandi-majority regions of Kohistan.
Since then, a multitude of internal and external factors have converged, creating a fertile breeding ground for the escalation of Shia persecutions in Gilgit-Baltistan. Some of these internal factors encompass the erosion of traditional culture, particularly music and dance, influenced by the Ziaulhaq era, widening social and economic disparities, and the pervasive issue of youth unemployment. Additionally, the shift from rural to urban migration, with a majority leaning towards anti-Shia sentiments, has altered the demographic composition of Gilgit and other towns.
Furthermore, the contested status of Gilgit-Baltistan and prolonged direct governance from Islamabad, following the Ziaulhaqi-Doctrine, has not only restricted political participation and hindered institutional development but has also impeded the harnessing of local resources, including hydropower and minerals. The severe religious constraints placed on Shia Muslims in Gilgit-Baltistan have exacerbated the situation, leading them to feel increasingly marginalized and their religious freedom curtailed. This sense of oppression has driven them to the brink, where they perceive themselves as having their backs against the wall.
During the early 1980s, the construction of the Karakoram Highway, recognized as the highest paved road globally, was completed. This highway linked China’s Xinjiang province to Pakistan’s Gilgit-Baltistan region. This significant infrastructure project coincided with the upsurge of religious militancy in Pakistan. While the highway played a pivotal role in breaking Gilgit-Baltistan’s physical isolation and opening doors to economic opportunities, it simultaneously heightened the region’s susceptibility to new challenges. These challenges encompassed the illicit influx of weapons and drugs, as well as the propagation of intolerant attitudes from the predominantly Deobandi Shia-phobic areas to the south. Additionally, the highway triggered demographic shifts within Gilgit and other towns.
In 1988, as Zia-ul-Haq’s rule was drawing to a close, a mujahedeen lashkar (religious militia), numbering over eighty thousand according to some estimates, launched an invasion of Gilgit. This horrific incident resulted in the massacre of over four hundred members of the Shia community and the complete destruction of several Shia villages. This attack was instigated by a rumor that claimed a Sunni massacre by Shias in Gilgit, which some argue was intentionally disseminated to serve as a pretext for Deobandi militants to carry out these brutal assaults.
This massacre marked the inception of a more sinister and deadly phase of Shia persecution. It involved well-equipped militant organizations, often with external backing, including support from entities like the Haqqani network, Afghan and Pakistan-based Taliban groups, which provided both financial resources and training. In contrast to earlier attacks on Shia Muslims, which tended to be localized and contained, the post-1988 assaults have taken on a more brutal, unpredictable, and severe nature.
Following the massacre, the Shia community in Gilgit-Baltistan became acutely aware of its vulnerability to well-organized Deobandi militant groups. Fueled by the radical Shia-phobic ideology of Ahle-Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat (ASWJ), also known as Anjuman-e-Sipah-Sahabah (ASSP), and founded by Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, these groups received support from various takfiri Shia-phobic segments within the Deobandi clergy. Tanzeem-e-Ahle-Sunnat-Wal-Jammat, acting as a proxy for ASWJ, initiated a project aimed at altering the demographic composition of Gilgit-Baltistan. This project involved tactics such as ethnic cleansing or coercive migration of Shia populations.
Similar endeavors were undertaken in Shia neighborhoods within the former Kurram Agency and Orakzai Agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), with the involvement of entities like the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and the death squads of ASWJ (SSP). These initiatives received cover and patronage from Ziaulhaqi lobbies within the establishment, operating under the concept of Strategic Depth. These actions have exacerbated the persecution and marginalization of Shia Muslims in Gilgit-Baltistan.
The escalating persecution and targeted killings of Shia Muslims in Pakistan as a whole have played a direct role in exacerbating the violence in Gilgit-Baltistan. Importantly, the recent period has witnessed the emergence of a destructive cycle: faith-based violence against Shias in Pakistan fuels similar violence in Gilgit-Baltistan, and conversely, the violence in Gilgit-Baltistan further fuels faith-based violence against Shias in other parts of Pakistan. This interconnected cycle of violence has deepened the overall crisis faced by Shia communities across the country
This violence is instigated by a combination of emotional reactions to immediate media reports of attacks on Shia-persecuted individuals elsewhere and the expanding connections between local militants and their national networks.
A previous analysis conducted in Gilgit-Baltistan revealed that between 1988 and 2010, there were 200 registered cases of Shia-related murders, not accounting for an estimated 170 attempted murders during that period. In 2011 alone, an additional forty-four cases of Shia killings were documented. This tally does not encompass the tragic killings of nearly one hundred individuals in 2012, predominantly Shia, who were traveling between Islamabad and Gilgit, nor does it include the subsequent retaliatory killings of Sunnis in Gilgit town.
The deteriorating security situation since the 1990s has had a profound impact on the collective psyche and economic livelihood of the people residing in Gilgit-Baltistan. The tourism industry, a vital sector of the local economy, has been particularly hard-hit, especially since the events of 9/11. Economic devastation is being inflicted upon the Shia community in Gilgit-Baltistan, as part of a larger project aimed at transforming Shia neighborhoods in the region into areas predominantly populated by radical Deobandi grou
Hermann Kreutzmann, a scholar with over three decades of experience studying this region, has reported on the profound impact on the tourist industry:
Various crises, both domestically generated within Pakistan and those originating from external factors affecting the country, have occurred since the mid-1990s. These crises, over time, have seen shorter intervals between them. However, none had as profound an impact as the events of 9/11. Almost overnight, the once-thriving tourism industry, which had enjoyed its best season in seven years, collapsed to nearly nothing. Subsequently, the international tourism flow reached its lowest point in over two decades.
The consequences were stark: tourism operators were forced to shutter their offices, tourist guides faced layoffs, demand for local services and products evaporated, loans went unpaid, and many tourism entrepreneurs teetered on the brink of bankruptcy. Those who had previously derived a significant income from tourism found themselves returning to their agricultural roots, engaging once more in mountain farming. For many, this became their only insurance against economic hardship, particularly if they did not receive a pension from prior government employment.
It’s important to note that the majority of the victims of the destruction of the tourism industry in Gilgit-Baltistan were Shia Muslims
The evolving environment around Gilgit-Baltistan has undoubtedly accelerated the process of persecution against Shia Muslims in the region. Hundreds of thousands of Shias Muslims from Gilgit-Baltistan have been compelled to either relocate within the region or flee externally to escape this persecution.
Today, it’s not an overstatement to assert that a nexus has formed between local faith-based militants and national and global jihadists, all targeting Shia neighborhoods in Gilgit-Baltistan.
In previous attacks on commuters along the Karakoram Highway and Babusar Pass, it appears that faith-based militant groups with a Shia-phobic agenda have been aiming to reignite sectarian conflicts as a means to gain a foothold in this strategically important region. It’s worth noting that Gilgit-Baltistan, along with the adjoining district of Chitral in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, finds itself surrounded by active Islamist militant movements from various directions.
These encompass areas ranging from Afghanistan and the Southern Gorno-Badhakshan region of Tajikistan in the west and north, to China’s Xinjiang province and Indian-controlled Kashmir in the east, and the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) regions of Pakistan in the south. This complex geopolitical landscape underscores the significance of Gilgit-Baltistan and the challenges it faces from multiple directions.
Indeed, the strategic significance of Gilgit-Baltistan and Chitral has grown considerably due to their proximity to regions in Pakistan and Afghanistan where the Taliban have regained power, and ISIS has established strongholds. There have been reports indicating that groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Khorasan are expanding their influence in Gilgit-Baltistan. This heightened presence of extremist Shia-phobic elements increases the vulnerability of Gilgit-Baltistan falling into their hands.
Furthermore, the multitude of mountain passes in Gilgit-Baltistan, connecting it to Afghanistan, China, and India on one side and to Pakistani Kashmir, Swat, and other remote valleys of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa on the other, compounds its geographical vulnerability. These passes, with an average elevation of approximately sixteen thousand feet, are situated in remote and desolate areas, making them extremely challenging to effectively guard and secure. This vulnerability poses significant security concerns for the region.
In the current situation, it’s evident that mainstream media and some elite members of civil society in Pakistan may not be fully representing the truth regarding the emerging protests and the rising concerns of the Shia community in Gilgit-Baltistan. It appears that one-sided propaganda may be prevailing. Shias in Gilgit-Baltistan are voicing their grievances over restrictions on their right to practice their religion and their right to freely express their faith. They are particularly concerned about what they perceive as discriminatory amendments in the Blasphemy Laws, which are reportedly being used against them. This situation underscores the importance of ensuring that all voices and perspectives are heard and that the rights and concerns of all communities are respected and addressed within a democratic and inclusive framework.
Within the discourse surrounding the situation in Gilgit-Baltistan and the treatment of Shia Muslims in Pakistan, there are notable apprehensions regarding the way the media handles these issues. These concerns chiefly revolve around the media’s stance on amendments to the Blasphemy Law and their explanations for the persecution and infringement of religious rights endured by Shia Muslims.
One can observe a significant dearth of contextual and vital background information in media coverage, both within Pakistan and India. Several critical aspects remain conspicuously absent from reporting, including:
Understanding Genocide: Is Shi’a Muslim community facing ‘Genocidal Campaign’? By Abbas Zaidi
Concerns in Media Coverage:
When discussing the media’s coverage of the situation in Gilgit-Baltistan and the treatment of Shia Muslims in Pakistan, it’s wise to remember the old saying, “Actions speak louder than words.” These concerns stem from the media’s defense of additions to the Blasphemy Law and the justifications for the persecution and denial of religious rights of Shia Muslims. In the world of journalism, where truth is paramount, the adage “Honesty is the best policy” should guide us.
Lack of Context and Background Information:
In media segments within Pakistan and India, there’s a notable absence of context and crucial background information, reminding us of the proverb, “A half-truth is a whole lie.” Specific omissions in reporting include the failure to mention a controversial passage in an additional Blasphemy Bill affecting the practice of religion for Shia and Sunni sub-sects. It’s often said, “The devil is in the details,” and indeed, the devil lies in the unreported details.
Importance of Balanced Reporting:
These concerns serve as a reminder of the age-old wisdom encapsulated in the proverb, “A stitch in time saves nine.” They emphasize the importance of balanced and context-rich reporting to provide a comprehensive understanding of complex issues like the situation in Gilgit-Baltistan and the treatment of religious minority communities in Pakistan. Media outlets should adhere to the timeless adage, “Let justice be done though the heavens fall,” ensuring that all perspectives and facts are considered. After all, “The truth will set you free.”
References:
Hermann Kreutzmann, “The Karakoram Landscape and the Recent History of the Northern Areas,” in Karakoram: Hidden Treasures in the Northern Areas of Pakistan, ed. Stefano Bianca (Turin: Allemandi, 2007).
“Kohistan, Kaghan Incidents: Hazara Police Claim to Have Traced Sectarian Killers,” Express Tribune, August 29, 2012,
AFP, “At Least 20 Shias Pulled off Bus, Shot Dead in Northern Pakistan,” Dawn.com, August 16, 2012,
http://www.dawn. com/2012/08/16/several-forced-off-buses-killed-in-northern-pakistan.
AFP, “Shia Killing: TTP Claims Responsibility for Mansehra Attack,” Express Tribune, August 16, 2012,
http://www.tribune. com.pk/story/422907/sectarian-attack-16-sunnis-gunned-down-near-gilgit.
Zafar Iqbal, “Gilgit Baltistan: Paradise on Fire,” Viewpoint, no. 129, November 30, 2012,
http://www.viewpointonline. net/gilgit-baltistan-paradise-on-fire.html.
Seema Shekhawat, “Sectarianism in Gilgit-Baltistan,” Faultlines vol. 20, article 4, January 18,
An exception was the attempt by the Mehtar of Chitral in the first quarter of the twentieth century to forcefully convert Ismailis from Upper Chitral to the Sunni faith. These events led to substantial outmigration of Ismailis from Chitral to the Gilgit Agency that was under British administration (Hermann Kreutzmann, “Kashmir and the Northern Areas of Pakistan: Boundary-making along contested frontiers,” Geography vol. 62, no. 3: 215).
Ghulam Nabi, in a discussion with the author on the causes of growing sectarianism, Gilgit, October 12, 2012.
Hermann Kreutzmann, “The Karakoram Highway as a prime corridor exchange between Pakistan and China,” in Integrated Tourism Concepts to Contribute to Sustainable Development in Mountain Regions, eds. Hermann Kreutzmann, Amin Beg, Lu Zhaozhi, and J. Richter (Bonn, 2008), pp. 30–31.
Aziz Ali Dad, “Anatomy of Sectarian Violence,” Pamire Times, September 25, 2012, www.pamirtimes. net/2012/09/25/anatomy-of-sectarian-violence.
Jurgen Creutzman, “Gilgit-Baltistan: A Land Seldom Traveled, ” Gilgit-Baltistan Tribune, August 23, 2012, http:// gbtribune.wordpress.com/2012/08/23/gilgit-baltistan-a-land-seldom-traveled.
Altaf Hussain, “Sectarian Violence Might Break Out in Pakistan,” Daily News and Analysis (Mumbai), September 2, 2012,
http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_sectarian-violence-might-break-pakistan-altaf-hussain_1735695.
China, as a rising economic power, is certainly interested in the mineral resources and transit facilities in Pakistan but, given its own problems in the Xinjiang Region, is extremely careful not to embroil itself in a larger and more complex conflict with the Islamist militants in Pakistan.
Conflict Dynamics in Gilgit-Baltistan – by Izhar Hunzai, 2013 by the United States Institute of Peace.
