Summary
The extensive discourse provided outlines Ahmad Javaid’s controversial and divisive approach towards Shia Islam, positioning him as a sectarian figure. Javaid utilizes his platform to propagate anti-Shia sentiments, leveraging his self-proclaimed expertise in various disciplines to lend credibility to his biased narratives. His speeches and lectures, particularly the one titled “Well-done Iran, Beware Pakistan,” exemplify his efforts to stoke sectarian divisions, presenting Shias as a monolithic group aligned with foreign interests, specifically Iran, and accusing them of pursuing an expansionist agenda.
Javaid’s interpretation of religious and historical concepts, such as the ‘End of History’ and ‘Wahdat Ummah,’ is framed to vilify Shia beliefs and practices, suggesting they are not only theologically incorrect but also politically motivated to undermine Sunni Islam. His assertion that Shias aim to convert Sunnis and prioritize allegiance to Iran over their national identities feeds into broader anti-Shia narratives prevalent in certain segments of Pakistani society.
Moreover, Javaid’s comparison of Sunni tolerance to Shia assertiveness, his condemnation of Shia practices and loyalties, and his framing of the Shia-Sunni divide in geopolitical terms all contribute to a polarized and sectarian discourse. He overlooks the pluralistic essence of the Indo-Islamic civilization, attributing it solely to Sunni contributions and dismissing the shared heritage and inter-sectarian coexistence that have historically characterized the region.
His commentary on the political landscape, particularly the alliance between Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf and the Shia political party MWM, underscores his attempt to politicize religious identities, portraying political cooperation with Shias as a threat to national and religious interests.
In essence, Ahmad Javaid’s rhetoric exemplifies a disturbing trend where religious identity is exploited to foster division, marginalize minority sects, and promote a singular narrative of Islam that excludes and vilifies divergent beliefs and practices. This approach not only undermines the unity and diversity of the Muslim community but also poses significant challenges to inter-sectarian harmony and the broader societal fabric in regions affected by such discourse.
Ahmed Javaid’s contentious figure; his stature in literature has consistently been under scrutiny. He portrays himself as a Sufi poet, writer, and intellectual to validate his standing, simultaneously adopting various roles. Recently, he was seen expounding on Sufism, philosophy, and literary criticism, positioning himself as a preeminent sage within Sunni Islam. However, upon closer examination, it becomes evident that his rhetoric is anti-Shia, promoting hate speech. He actively disseminates animosity towards Shia Islam and its followers, distorting Shia identity. This aligns with the objectives of a network known for persecuting and targeting Shias in Pakistan, often referred to as Nasibi. A leading entity in this network, Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), also known as Sipah Sahabah Pakistan (SSP), initiated anti-Shia rhetoric in 1984, maligning Pakistani Shia Muslims as foreign agents and heretics, fueling a campaign of persecution and genocide. ASWJ’s campaign has gained traction across various social strata.
Ahmad Javaid, claiming to be a progressive, enlightened theologian and a disciple of Ibn Arabi, distorts and misinterprets key concepts, using them to further sectarian divisions. His recent lecture, “Weldon Iran, Beware Pakistan” (Shahbaash Iran, Khbardar Pakistan), uploaded to his YouTube channel, is laced with animosity towards Shiite Muslims, inciting fear and violence among Sunni Muslims against Shiites globally while misrepresenting Shiite beliefs.
In a recent discourse, Ahmad Javaid expanded on his controversial views, referencing Mahmoud Darwish, the renowned Palestinian poet. Javaid’s portrayal starkly contrasts with Darwish’s legacy as a secular, progressive Arab nationalist, uninvolved in sectarian conflicts. Darwish, a critic of political Islam, advocated for secular governance and opposed the sectarian violence undermining Palestinian unity. His work, deeply infused with religious motifs, occasionally drew the ire of Islamic authorities, as seen in the backlash against Marcel Khalife for setting Darwish’s poetry to music. Unlike Darwish, who openly critiqued religious fundamentalism, Javaid opts to manipulate Darwish’s stances to bolster his own sectarian narratives.
Here is the URL of the lecture that Javaid uploaded two months ago, which set the stage for the “extended lecture” that starkly revealed him as a Shia-phobic individual and a perpetrator of anti-Shia hate speech.
Extended lecture’s link
He explains why this interpretive lecture has to be given.
“My arguments regarding the ‘Situation in Gaza are instrumental in framing Topics’ and facilitate overcoming the challenges in comprehending my interpretations, articulated in a scholarly and epistemological manner. This resembles the evidence supporting the shallowness of the concept of ‘Wahdat Ummah’ and likens the situation to a preview of the ‘End of History.’ Here, ‘End of History’ signifies the ultimate confrontation between good and evil, a notion deeply embedded in the collective psyche of Muslims. We are witnessing the initial chapters of events that prelude the ultimate battle before the day of judgement.”
Here, Ahmad Javaid employs the phrase “End of History” to signify efforts aimed at terminating the longstanding conflict between Sunnis and Shias—two opposing sects—culminating in the ultimate triumph of Shiites over Sunnis. Later in his detailed lecture, he criticizes Shias for distorting the principles of historical dialectics by reframing the battle between good and evil in terms of Sunni versus Shia. He accuses Shia Muslims of misinterpreting the concept of ‘Wahdat Ummah’ (unity of the community) as a call for the conversion of all Sunnis to Shiism rather than promoting unity between Shia and Sunni. According to him, Shia Muslims have perverted the law of historical dialectics, and their support for oppressed communities, such as the Palestinians, is not genuinely based on siding with righteousness over wickedness. Instead, he claims, their support is motivated by an intent to convert individuals to Shiism.
“If we fail to approach this situation with the seriousness and sensitivity it demands, viewing it as a critical opportunity for preserving our Muslim identity, we risk losing that very identity. Without it, we may find ourselves defined by alternate identities.”
In this statement, Ahmad Javed merges ‘Muslim identity’ and ‘Sunni identity,’ adopting a perspective that is narrowly aligned with Nasbism and deliberately omitting ‘Shia identity’ from his definition of Muslim identity. He depicts Shia identity as diametrically opposed to Muslim identity, considering it the paramount existential threat to the latter’s continuity. He frames the scenario for Sunni Muslims as a crucial ‘Do or Die’ juncture, emphasizing the urgency and gravity of the situation.
“Every group and organization supporting the Palestinians is influenced or governed by Iran… When analyzing Iranian support for the Palestinians, it’s crucial to understand the concept of velayat-e-faqih. The majority of Shia Muslims do not subscribe to the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, as they understand that endorsing this concept could reduce the anticipated return of Imam Mahdi to merely a mythological belief. …… Shias offer support to the oppressed with the intention of converting them to Shia Islam. “We” should have no reservations about this development; clearly, it aligns with our aspirations, as the system we endorse is being effectively perpetuated by “them.”… ‘They’ (The Shia community) hold the view and believe that imamate precedes prophethood; they regard the authority of imamate as more encompassing and substantial than that of prophethood……… Shias view the Imamate as an authority on worldly matters, placing it above the Prophet. They steadfastly maintain and prioritize their Shia beliefs without relegating them to secondary status. Their objective is to proliferate ‘Shiism,’ whether through ‘Tableegh’ (preaching) or ‘Militancy.’ They are dedicatedly working towards transforming Shias into a majority. As someone outside the Shia community, I have no qualms about this. Yet, I wish our people would adopt a similar zeal. They observe the religious jurist or Wali Faqih, disseminating what Shias deem their religion.’
Ahmad Javaid employs a reductionist approach and engages in sophistry to characterize the forces supporting the Palestinian people against Israeli aggression and military operations. He categorizes all supporting groups and organizations as being under the control or influence of Iran, deliberately ignoring the diverse ideological, political, and humanitarian motivations behind the support for Palestine. By doing this, he draws a sectarian line to define the forces backing the Palestinian cause, aiming to propagate an anti-Shia narrative within the context of Palestine and the conflict in Gaza.
His narrative is designed to instill a sense of insecurity and intensify Shia phobia among Sunni populations, particularly targeting the urban, educated middle class. Javaid asserts that all Shias, whom he claims adhere to the concept of Vilayat-e-Faqih without exception in his lecture, are either controlled by or under the influence of Iran. While he claims that majority Shias in countries outside Iran may not accept Vilayat-e-Faqih, he pointedly excludes Pakistani Shias from this category, suggesting they all subscribe to the ideology, thereby reinforcing his biased and divisive narrative. He then contends that a significant number of Shias consciously steer clear of the doctrine of ‘Vilayat-e-Faqih,’ understanding that it fundamentally contradicts the principle of ‘Occultation.’ It becomes evident to anyone exploring the spectrum of Shia beliefs that ‘Occultation’ is an essential element of the faith for every Shiite Muslim, irrespective of their acceptance or rejection of Vilayat-e-Faqih.
He constructed a contentious dichotomy, identifying ‘We’ with ‘Sunnis’ and ‘Them’ with ‘Shias,’ thereby specifically marginalizing Pakistani Shias and excluding them from the realms of Islam and Pakistan.
Javaid’s divisive dichotomy, casting ‘Sunnis’ as ‘We’ and ‘Shias’ as ‘Them,’ reinforces harmful meta-narratives that label Shias as apostates (‘Shia Kafir Hain’), traitors (‘Shia Ghaddar Hain’), and disbelievers in the finality of prophethood (‘Shia Khatam-e-Nubuwwat Ke Aqeede Par Imaan Nahi Rakhte’). These narratives are not just labels; they are potent slogans that resonate with and energize Takfiri and Shia-phobic groups. Such organizations exploit these narratives to fuel their violent and militant campaigns against Shias in Pakistan, perpetuating persecution and even genocidal actions. These narratives also serve as a foundation for cementing anti-Shia hate speech, further polarizing Pakistani society, and endangering the Shia community.
Javaid’s method of creating a divisive dichotomy effectively bolsters a narrative that denies the reality of the ongoing Shia-genocidal and Shia-persecution campaigns in Pakistan. This approach reinforces false binaries and a ‘balancing’ theory, which resonates strongly with a significant segment of the liberal middle class. This mindset is visible among certain prominent individuals who, despite their liberal, progressive, nationalist, or even leftist appearances, are part of the upper echelons of the liberal elite. They utilize these deceptive binaries and theories of balance to rationalize anti-Shia hate speech and even justify violent and terrorist acts against Shia Muslims. Such justifications, under the guise of intellectual or liberal discourse, serve to perpetuate and normalize the discrimination and violence faced by the Shia community.
Many liberals, leftists, and so-called progressive Islamists have been observed rationalizing acts of anti-Shia violence and terrorism in Pakistan, interpreting them as responses to the situation in the Middle East or as a reaction to the perceived oppression and suppression of Sunni populations there. This perspective aligns with the arguments presented by Ahmad Javaid in his extensive lecture, where he seemingly extends this narrative. By framing the violence in Pakistan as a reaction to external events or perceived injustices, these individuals provide a veneer of justification for the anti-Shia sentiments and actions, thus diverting attention from the internal sectarian biases and issues fueling such violence.
“I am concerned about the expansion of (enforced) Shiism, and my concern is the justification of my faith. I have clear reservations and fears about the expansionism of Shiism. ……… The Sunnis of the subcontinent are often seen as exceptionally tolerant compared to other religious groups. Despite being a decisive majority, they allow ‘Practicing Shia’ to maintain their distinct ‘Identity,’ suggesting a level of Sunni tolerance. Yet, there is a growing concern among Sunnis as they perceive the visibility and assertiveness of Shias to be increasing. Sunnis feel that traditional idioms and practices of Ahle Sunnah and Tasanun are fading from society, and there are instances where Sunni elders are labeled as apostates by others. ……. However, there is a perception among some Sunnis that Shias, particularly those who subscribe to the concept of ‘Vilayat-e-Faqih,’ express a higher allegiance to Iran than their own countries. This notion feeds into fears that Shias could prioritize Iran’s directives over national interests, especially those who believe in the authority of the ‘Vali Faqih.’
Here again, Ahmad Javaid condemns all Shia Muslims while placing them in the category of perpetrators of an enforced expansionist agenda on Sunni Muslims and claims that ‘Composite culture’ and ‘Pluralistic essence’ of the civilization of the Indian subcontinent are sole Sunni achievements; thus, he credits Sunnis only for the ‘Indo-Islamic civilization’ (Hind-Islami-Tehzeeb) and reinforces that the existence of Shia Muslims in a distinguished community in the Indian subcontinent is just due to the tolerant Sunni tradition. Ahmad Javaid here presents a sectarian and very opposite consensus among the historians of the Indian subcontinent over the fact that Indo-Islamic civilization is a shared achievement of the people of the Indian subcontinent, not of only one religious or ethnic group. Ahmad Javaid asserts here that Shias are an existential threat to the Sunni community, and they are blasphemers and very abusive to Shiites.
Shias have grown increasingly outspoken and assertive. Many Shias believe that Iran supports them and could potentially intervene on their behalf, as they perceive it has done for ‘us’ before. This perception has led to accusations of divided loyalties among Shias in various countries. Those Shias who adhere to the principle of Vilayat-e-Faqih are often seen as being more loyal to Iran than to their own countries. This belief system suggests that for Shias who follow Vilayat-e-Faqih, there is a religious obligation to prioritize allegiance to Iran over their native homelands.
The quoted lines indicate that Ahmad Javaid aligns with the Shia-phobic segment of urban middle-class intellectuals. He constructs and propagates stereotypes and archetypes about Shia Muslims, thereby advancing an agenda of Shia hatred. His narrative seems to contribute to the broader discourse that vilifies Shia practices and loyalties, echoing common prejudices that fuel sectarian division.
https://shiamuslimgenocide.com/general-elections-february-2024-hate-speech-targeting-shia-muslims/
The election results have raised concerns about potential threats to our national and religious interests, which could gravely impact these domains.
Biases in State and Society Regarding Anti-Shia Hate Speech in Pakistan
Here Ahmad Javaid lowers himself more and more, echoing a similar reaction that was of the ASWJ over the alliance between Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf and Shia political party MWM. Here, Javaid declared the alliance between them a potential threat to the national and religious interests of Pakistan.
The global Islamic community is perceived to be engaging in superficial dialectical structuring. Historical dialecticism, considered a natural law, is reportedly being distorted by Shias. It is posited that every Sunni’s duty is to persuade Shias to refrain from such actions. The analogy drawn suggests that while hell is guarded by one entity, Islam is purportedly safeguarded by two. This metaphor underscores the perceived need for vigilance and corrective action within the Islamic community to uphold its principles and unity.
Ahmad Javid’s antipathy towards the Shia Muslim community is evidently pronounced in his extensive lecture, aligning him with certain pseudo-intellectuals who delve into sectarian rhetoric via disciplines like literature, philosophy, religious studies, and international relations. These individuals, including Javid, are criticized for co-opting and distorting established terminologies and concepts from these fields to propagate anti-Shia sentiments. Such actions not only spread hate speech but also corrupt the intellectual integrity and academic rigor of these knowledge domains.
Notes:
Occultation (Arabic: غَيْبَة, ghayba) in Shia Islam refers to the eschatological belief that the Mahdi, a descendant of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, has already been born and he was subsequently concealed, but he will reemerge and he will establish justice and peace on earth at the end of time.
The Usulis are the majority of the Twelver Shi’a Muslim group. They differ from their now much smaller rival Akhbari group in favoring the use of ijtihad (i.e., reasoning) in the creation of new rules of fiqh; in assessing hadith to exclude traditions they believe unreliable; and in considering it obligatory to obey a mujtahid when seeking to determine Islamically correct behavior.
Hundreds of thousands of Shiite Muslims aligned with the Usuli school of thought adhere to the concept of ‘Vilayat-e-Faqih’ in a nuanced, reductionist manner, deliberately omitting state governance from the domain of the ‘Vali Faqih.’ They uphold the belief that the role of the head of state is exclusively reserved for the ‘Imam’.
