Editorial Note:

The Shi’a Muslim community finds itself confronting a systematic campaign of resistance and persecution, notably during the observance of Azadari rituals and customs, particularly within the initial ten days of the Islamic month of Muharram. This ordeal is perpetuated by anti-Shi’a sectarian Takfiri elements emanating from various Sunni sects, with a majority hailing from the Deobandi school of thought, a sub-sect of the Sunni Hanafi sect. The proclivity of these Takfiri radicals to exhibit hostility towards the Shi’a community, particularly in the context of Azadari—a pivotal facet of Shi’a religious practices and beliefs—has been a persistent theme in their activities since the era of British colonial rule.

However, with the establishment of Pakistan in the western region of the country, we have witnessed an alarming upswing in sectarian resistance and violence targeting Shi’a Muslim religious practices, notably directed against Azadari processions and gatherings (Majalis-i-Aza). It is important to note that while some analysts erroneously attempt to attribute the current persecution campaign by anti-Shi’a sectarian Takfiri elements, such as the ASWJ of the Deobandi sect or the TLP of the Barelvi sect, to events like the Iranian Revolution of 1979 or the Saudi-Iranian conflict, these events merely served as catalysts rather than root causes.

The ideological and historical underpinnings of the anti-Shi’a sectarian and Takfiri tendencies within Sunni sects stretch far beyond the 1980s and transcend the Iran-Saudi proxy war. In order to shed light on this complex and enduring issue, we present excerpts from the book “The Shi’as of Pakistan: An Assertive and Beleaguered Minority,” specifically drawn from the third chapter, ‘SHIAS IN PAKISTAN UNTIL 1958,’ authored by Andreas Rieck.

 

Conflicts about Shia ‘azâdârî processions and Shia-Sunni clashes during the month of Muharram had been frequent events on the Indian subcontinent already under British rule, including those parts which in 1947 became West Pakistan.314 Yet the problem assumed a larger dimension there than in the rest of the subcontinent, mainly for two reasons: one was the influx of Shia muhâjirs into many towns and villages of the Punjab and Sindh, either strengthening existing Shia communities or creating new ones. This went along with a marked increase of ‘azâdârî ceremonies and other manifestations of Shia religious life that were not always well received by the Sunni majority of these places. The second and probably more important factor for the growth of the sectarian problem was the high expectations raised among large sections of the Sunni ‘ulamâ’ through the creation of Pakistan. Regardless of whether they had supported the Muslim League during the Pakistan Movement or not, many Sunni ‘ulamâ’ felt their class entitled to have an important say in the political, legislative and judicial affairs of the new Islamic state.315 When meeting with a cold shoulder from the secularist establishment, they looked for ways and means to rally the ‘awâm behind their leadership. “Creating issues” has been a constant preoccupation for the politically ambitious ‘ulamâ’ in Pakistan ever since its foundation, and stirring up popular resentment against minorities was always one of the easiest means to achieve quick results. Thus, already in the first decade of Pakistan, a considerable amount of energy was spent on propaganda against Shia beliefs and religious practices by a section of the Sunni ‘ulamâ’ who were driven both by personal ambitions and genuine religious zeal. As explained in a previous chapter, the major religious movements antagonistic to Shias in nineteenth- and twentieth-century India have been the Ahl-i hadîth and the Deobandis.316 The latter has extended its influence to the North-West of British India and beyond to Afghanistan already since the second half of the nineteenth century through numerous graduates from the Dâr ul-‘Ulûm Deoband and later through the founding of religious schools on its model.317 In Pakistan, Deobandis had become the majority religious denomination in the NWFP and Balochistan already in the 1950s, and they have gradually established a strong presence in all towns of the Punjab and Sindh provinces, too.318 The Ahl-i hadîth was mainly an urban phenomenon in Pakistan until the 1960s, but its influence has since steadily grown due to lavish funding from Saudi Arabia and other factors.319 Both the Ahl-i hadîth and the Deobandi school of thought are preaching an austere, scripturalist version of Sunni Islam and are opposed to most manifestations of “folk Islam”, which they associate with syncretist Hindu influences. For example, they liken the cult of saints, which is very popular in rural Punjab and Sindh—as among Muslims of the subcontinent generally— to “idolatry”, as well as the excessive veneration of the Prophet Muhammad and the attribution of miraculous deeds to him. This puts the Deobandis and Ahl-i hadîth into principal theological conflict with the Barelvi school of thought, the majority religious denomination in the Punjab and Sindh that fully endorses these and other elements of Sunni folk Islam in India and Pakistan,320 but also with Shias, who attribute even more superhuman qualities and acts to the Prophet Muhammad and his ahl al-bait, i.e. his daughter Fatima and the twelve Imams. However, the main controversial issue between all Sunni denominations (including the Barelvis) and the Shias has remained the latter’s attitude towards the sahâba, and especially the first two Caliphs.

 

This is not to say that most ‘ulamâ’ of the Deobandi or Ahl-i hadith school of thought in Pakistan have been permanently involved in conflicts with Shias. There have been many examples of tolerance and goodwill towards the Shia minority from these ‘ulamâ’, one of them being the adoption of the “22 Principles” in January 1951.322 But a zealous section among them has always pursued the “mission” to have Shias in Pakistan socially isolated, have their freedom of religious observance restricted (at least in public) and ultimately have them excluded from the pale of Islam. Their activities have been an almost constant source of trouble—and often of physical threats—for Shias throughout the last more than six decades, with the magnitude of the problem depending largely on the attitudes of subsequent governments, civil servants and police officers entrusted with law and order.

In the 1950s the Tanzîm-i Ahl-i Sunnat (TAS)323 was the organisation most heavily involved in anti-Shia propaganda. The TAS, headed since its foundation by Maulana S. Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari, served as a common platform for those Sunni ‘ulamâ’, school- and college-teachers, journalists and other activists for whom confronting the Shia “heresy” was the most important “religious mission” required to be performed in Pakistan. All members of the TAS were affiliated to the Deobandi school of thought. The TAS also offered a convenient platform for those members of the Majlis-i Ahrâr-I Islâm who had opposed the Muslim League tooth-and-nail until 1947 and thereafter were in need of new issues to find a role for themselves in Pakistan.324 The first places where the TAS seems to have gained a popular foothold were some districts of the Punjab with a strong demographic and political presence of Shias, like Sargodha, Mianwali, Jhang, Multan and Muzaffargarh and Dera Ghazi Khan.325 Its professional preachers were touring these districts to stir up resentments and mobilise the Sunni population for the “defence of their rights and sanctities”. In April 1951, the newly elected ITHS chairman for the Punjab, Mufti Sonipati, gave the following account of the situation (excerpts): During the recent elections for the Punjab Assembly one group among the Islamic majority which is making organised efforts against us … has tried to raise the Shia-Sunni question in each constituency with Shia candidates. Especially in the Jhang District these sectarian elements of the majority have displayed this narrow-mindedness and fanaticism … because Jhang has been known as the centre of Shias since old times, the enemies of unity have made organised strong efforts to poison the sectarian atmosphere first of all there. Fanatical mullahs and seditious preachers have openly declared us outside of the pale of Islam and infidel (kâfir) in their election speeches. Those who do not object to eating with non-Muslims have exhorted the Muslims that eating and drinking with Shias is forbidden and harâm… In August 1952, Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari, protesting against a six-month-old ban for himself to enter the Mianwali District, wrote in the TAS organ Da‘wat:

… the Mianwali District327 is the most backward in all Punjab regarding the standard of education and has the first place in the standard of ignorance. The reason is that it is the house (sic) of Shi‘ism in all Punjab. Nowhere else in Pakistan the Shias are as strong as there. Zâkirs as numerous as the grains of sand of the Thall desert are indulging night and day in shameful abuse of the sahâba of the Prophet … not one tenth of the storm of abuse and insulting (sabbo-shatm) going on here throughout the year can be found anywhere else; especially the Bhakkar Subdivision is the centre of this curse… Naturally the TAS is popular in this district. There is probably not one village around Bhakkar where the TAS has not established a branch. The TAS is holding dozens of congregations in the Bhakkar Tehsil, and it is present on every railway station from the southern district borders to Kalabagh… There are no bans against the tabarrâ’îs throughout Pakistan … but those who put a check on rafz and Shi‘ism with arguments and proofs from the Koran are forbidden to speak in the Mianwali District … The government has ruled under the Punjab Safety Act that the person of Bukhari and his reciting of the Koran are representing a danger … Has even the nose of any Shia bled because of my continuous Koranic lectures throughout the Mianwali District since eight years?329 From May 1952 to March 1953, the attention of all radical Sunni ‘ulamâ’, including those affiliated to the TAS, was focussed on the campaign against the Ahmadis. Participants of an “All-Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention”

of the tahaffuz-i khatm-i nubuwwat movement in Lahore in July 1952 included both Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari and the ITHS Secretary Muzaffar Ali Shamsi.330 Yet there was only temporary relief for the Shias. For example, bans on ‘azâdârî processions because of Sunni opposition against them continued in some villages of the Sargodha District. When a delegation of the Majlis-i Ahrâr, which played a leading role in the anti-Ahmadi agitation, was asked to mediate on the issue during a visit to Sargodha, one of its members (Maulvi Abd ur-Rahman Mianvi) said that the very word “Shia” was offensive to them.331 Da‘wat continued its polemics against Shias throughout the anti-Ahmadi movement,332 making a mockery of the Sunni-Shia common front for the “protection of the finality of the prophethood” that some Shia ‘ulamâ’ might have imagined. After the clamp-down on the anti-Ahmadi agitation in March 1953, religious extremists had to scale down their activities for some time. On 18 September 1953 a new clause of the “Government Servants Conduct Rules” was published, forbidding members of the Civil Service propaganda for their own sect or any interference with sectarian conflicts.

There where no noteworthy incidents in the month of Muharram 1373H (10 September–9 October 1953) and only a few in Muharram 1374H (30 August–29 September 1954).334 It was only in 1955 that agitation against Shia ‘azâdârî resurfaced in earnest. The leaders of the new anti-Shia movement, which was to gain momentum in the following two years, included many of the same persons who had met with failure in their campaign against the Ahmadis in 1953. In Muharram 1375H (20 August–19 September 1955) ‘azâdârî processions were banned or attacked in at least twenty-five places in the Punjab,335 while the assault on an imâmbârgâh of migrants from Baltistan in Karachi left twelve people seriously injured.336 The government, faced with growing objections against ‘azâdârî in public places, was contemplating to make licences for Shia processions subject to agreement from the local people, namely the Sunni majority at each place. An “All-Pakistan ‘Azâdârî Convention” was planned in Lahore on 22–23 October 1955 to deal with that challenge, but had to be postponed due to the rivalry between the two large Shia organisations, ITHS and APSC.338 Instead, the first and only All-Pakistan Shia Convention in East Pakistan was held on 27 November 1955 in Dhaka, but it dealt mainly with problems of Shias in Bengal.

The first constitution of Pakistan enacted in March 1956 included some important safeguards for minorities,340 but Shia activists were not satisfied with Article 18, which made “the right to profess, practice, and propagate any religion” subject to “law, public order and morality”. One resolution of the ITHS convention held in Lahore from 23–25 March 1956 demanded the lifting of all bans and obstacles for ‘azâdârî and called on the government to make clear its policy on the matter until Muharram that year, otherwise the ITHS would be forced to take “efficient concrete action”.341 Such appeals were of no avail, and the TAS muballighûn stepped up their campaign against the “unlawful” (according to their interpretation of the sharî‘a) and “offensive” Shia practices of ‘azâdârî, apparently unchecked by the authorities.

For example, Professor Khalid Mahmud, then serving as lecturer in a college in Sialkot, and Maulana Manzur Ahmad from Narowal made highly provocative speeches against Shias in the Krishannagar quarter of Lahore in May 1956, ridiculing the Shia Imams and challenging the local Sunnis to prevent ‘azâdârî processions once and for all “if they had the guts to do so”.342 During the first ten days of Muharram 1376H (8–17 August 1956), the TAS organised oratory meetings in Sunni mosques of many towns in a deliberate attempt to provoke sectarian clashes.343 In the small town of Shahr Sultan (Muzaffargarh Dist.), thousands of armed villagers gathered to attack the Shia procession, which was then banned by the administration.

Apparently, the TAS strategy of portraying ‘azâdârî processions a “danger for law and order” worked. On 29 August 1956, shortly after ‘Âshûrâ that year, the TAS succeeded to rally support of other Sunni organisations, including the JUP of the Barelvis, during a meeting in Lahore devoted to the issue of “protection of the honour of the sahâba”.345 Draft statutes of a “Pakistan Sunni Board” were presented by the TAS, and four resolutions were passed unanimously there (excerpts):

1) This representative meeting of Sunni Muslims looks with great apprehension at the pro-Shia bias and open partiality of the Government of West Pakistan during the 10th of Muharram and other Shia ceremonies … this short-sighted policy will widen the gulf between Shias and Sunnis … and will cause a great danger to the consolidation and integrity of Pakistan … the deplorable policy of the government has disregarded the former status quo of Shia ceremonies and allowed open abuse and insulting and tabarrâ-bâzî346 …

2) The abuse and insulting of the khulafâ’-i râshidûn, the azwâj-i mutahharât347 and the sahâba-i kirâm during Shia ceremonies on the last 10th of Muharram has been very provocative and disgusting and has hurt the feelings of the Muslims … we appeal to Sunni Muslims to stay far from such ceremonies in future to avoid the danger of clashes.

3) … the present political and religious activities of the Shias are not only a danger for public order, but the ridiculing of the beliefs of Sunnis and abuses against the khulafâ’-i râshidûn, the azwâj-i mutahharât and the sahâba-I kirâm are denigrating the status of the prophecy [of Muhammad] …

4) It is said that the freedom granted to the offensive and provocative ceremonies

and meetings of the Shia sect is based on the articles in the constitution of Pakistan regarding freedom of speech and religious freedom … it was an unwise step to grant such freedoms without making them subject to public order, moral and honour.

The principal accusation made here—and on countless other occasions— that Shias were abusing and insulting the first three Caliphs and other sahâba during their religious ceremonies, has been emphatically and consistently denied by Shia leaders and the Shia press in Pakistan ever since the 1950s. It has been repeated again and again that abusing and insulting was religiously forbidden (harâm) for Shias, and that all they were doing was criticising the comportment of certain companions of the Prophet towards the ahl al-bait and distancing themselves from their acts.349 Although the fact that Shias pronounce curses on the first three Caliphs has been admitted, for example, during the 1939 Tabarrâ Agitation,350 it is neither intended nor possible for a study like this to verify or falsify claims and counter-claims regarding “abuse and insulting” (sabb-o-shatm). Instead, I will explain below some major lines of argument of both the apologistsand the detractors of ‘azâdârî.

Reacting to the rising level of sectarian tensions, which had become obvious in that year’s Muharram, the Chief Minister of West Pakistan, Muhammad Khan Sahib (October 1955–March 1957), formed a Shia-Sunni “Reconciliation Board” in November 1956. This Majlis-i Ittihâd-i Islâmî

(MII), presided by Home Secretary Sufi Muhammad Husain, included the leaders of all major Sunni organisations as well as nine prominent Shias.351 It took three sessions of the MII in the following months just to agree on a resolution calling on both sides to avoid vexing and provocative speeches, but the problem remained how to define “vexing” (dil-âzâr) and “provocative” (ishti‘âl-angîz).352 When Maulana Muhammad Isma‘il reserved for himself the right to speak out anything that was written in the books of Islamic history, the Sunni Maulana ‘Ala ud-Din Siddiqi replied that all such history, which was offensive to the sahâba, should be burnt. On 11 February 1957 the TAS organ Da‘wat reported that all members of the MII had admitted that cursing of the sahâba was indeed taking place during Shia majâlis. When this was repeated without comment in Muhammad Isma‘il’s journal Sadâqat, it caused an uproar among the Shia public which led the APSC members to resign temporarily from the MII.

In June 1957 the Sunni members of the MII tabled a resolution, which was taken by the editor of Razâkâr as a proof of his claim that the issue was not “abuse and insulting”, but rather mere “criticism” of the sahâba, whichsome Sunni hard-liners wished to be banned in Pakistan.355 The draft resolution read:

For the high goals of Shia-Sunni unity, the protection of the religious rights of each sect and the integrity of Pakistan … the responsible representatives of Shias and Sunnis agree on the following:

 

1) The Shias … are giving a clear declaration that in future the character and the conduct (zât aur sîrat) of the sahâba will not be attacked in any way in the press, from the pulpit, in meetings and processions, and that there will be no objection to the caliphate and politics of the khulafâ’-i râshidûn in writing or speech. If anywhere such an act is committed, the Shias will denounce it forcefully and distance themselves from the responsible persons. This resolution of the Shia and Sunni leaders will be announced at a great public meeting in the presence of representatives from the government and the press.

2) Once this resolution has been fully implemented and vexing and provocative propaganda against the sahâba-i kirâm has come to an end, then Sunnis will not make any objections against the religious ceremonies of the Shias and will not disturb their ‘azâdârî processions.

Not surprisingly, such a “tit-for-tat” was rejected as unacceptable for Shias during a session of the ITHS Working Committee (Lahore, 14 June).357 In the meantime, both the TAS and the Shia organisations had reaffirmed their positions at large public gatherings. A “Tablîghî Conference” of the TAS in Multan in February 1957 passed a number of resolutions that aimed, according to the commentary of Razâkâr, at “prohibiting all Shia tablîgh in Pakistan” by making ‘azâdârî processions subject to agreement of the local Sunnis.358 Resolution No. 1 of that conference complained that the authorities were granting licences for processions to “irresponsible individuals” and that the Sunnis would be informed too late about them, thus creating the danger of clashes. It was urged to form representative committees of local Sunnis at every place, which would have to be consulted beforehand.359 Another resolution accused the Shias of having staged many processions without licences or on other than the agreed routes and thereby provoked clashes.360 One speaker at the TAS conference, Taj Muhammad Khan Durrani, infuriated Shias with the remark that they could make their “mule processions” throughout the year in their imâmbârgâhs, but it would be unbearable for Sunnis that such “mule driving” had to take place in the bazaars.361

The Shia organisations, for their part, joined hands to convene a first “All-Pakistan ‘Azâdârî Conference” in Ahmadpur East on 17–19 May 1957. Its Resolution No. 1 declared ‘azâdârî as the “life-blood of the Shia qaum”,362 a beloved and special religious obligation, which would reflect all their beliefs and accepted truths (musallamât), but would nevertheless be a “symbol of Muslim unity”. It was deeply regretted that elements opposed to the unity of Muslims were doing harm to the national unity by mobilising a front against ‘azâdârî, and that the government was a silent spectator to their mischief.363 Other resolutions included mainly Shia self-criticism: it was advised to maintain tolerance and unity of the Muslims in Muharram, to organise only one procession at each place, and not to miss the obligatory prayers during the processions. The zâkirs and ‘ulamâ’ were asked “to show a little spirit of sacrifice considering the economic situation of the sponsors of majâlis” while the latter were exhorted to keep their promises of payment to the preachers faithfully. The preachers were also asked to speak about the historical events of Muharram “only based on trustworthy traditions”.364 A twenty-four-member “‘Azâdârî-Council” chaired by Muhammad Isma‘il was formed in which ITHS and APSC were represented equally.365 The Council was supposed to “find a solution” for the growing resistance against ‘azâdârî processions before the coming Muharram (29 July–27 August 1957), but had not even started working by mid-June that year. At the same time, the TAS brought forward a new kind of objection against the Shias’ “life-blood”. In an editorial of Da‘wat titled “The only solution for the ‘azâdârî question” (17 May 1957) it was argued that:

… in Islam there is no place for mourning even the death of an ordinary Muslim, let alone to hold organised ‘azâdârî for living martyrs. The Islamic sharî‘a is strongly prohibiting individual loud and visible mourning (sôg siyâpa) for men. Sunnis have two kinds of objections against ‘azâdârî: Principally and theoretically it is contradicting their beliefs, and in practical terms it is usurping their religious right. Sunnis regard organised mâtam in the streets and markets as the biggest sin against the pure person of our Lord Husain… Just as you Shias consider the killing of Imam Husain and other martyrs of Karbala by Ibn Ziyad and Shimr a great sin, we Sunnis consider it a great sin, an insult to the status of Husain, and a disgrace to the status of martyrdom, to perform such a regular display of loud and visible mourning in the streets and bazaars for him.

Shias complained that whenever they criticised beliefs of the Sunnis they would be immediately accused of “abusing and insulting”, whereas the preachers of the TAS, viewing themselves as “representing the majority”,would feel free at any time to use harsh and insulting words against Shias

and make a mockery of their sanctities.368 During the first ten days of Muharram 1377H (1957), vitriolic propaganda by the TAS with speeches and posters reached a new climax. As predicted by the Shia organisations, violent assaults on ‘azâdârî processions took place on different places in

the Punjab on that year’s ‘Âshûrâ’ (7 August). Three Shias where killed during an armed attack on their procession in the small town of Sitpur (Muzaffargarh Dist.). In Ahmadpur East, where the ground had been prepared by speeches of Taj Muhmmad Khan Durrani, Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari and Khalid Mahmud, one was killed and three were seriously injured when stones were thrown at a Shia procession and Shias hit back with the chains they carried for self-flagellation. The government ordered a judicial inquiry in these two places, which led to death sentences for five

accused in the Sitpur case in December 1958.372 The ITHS and APSC held the TAS responsible at a joint protest meeting at Karbalâ’-i Gâme Shâh (Lahore) on 18 August, but also blamed the government for its failure to protect the religious rights of each sect as granted by the constitution.

 

1. Muhammad Ali Shamsi, who had just returned from a trip to Ahmadpur East, predicted even that Shias might start to raise the slogan of “Shi‘istan” if the majority would continue to put pressure on them to such an extent. Apart from the two said judicial inquiries, the Government of West Pakistan (led by Chief Minister Abd ur-Rashid from July 1957 to March 1958) confined itself to the usual pious

appeals for the “unity of Muslims”.

 

This encouraged the TAS to go one step further and publish the following “Unanimous demand of the Sawâd-i A‘zam376 of Pakistan from the Government of West Pakistan”:

 

The painful and bloody events of Muharram and the serious present situation have given proof to the claim of the Sunnis that mâtamî julûs are the cause of rioting, unrest, plunder and bloodshed, the reason for sectarian tensions and bitterness, and the ground for Shia-Sunni clashes.

They are disturbing the calm of the country and destroying the unity of the nation. In the face of this permanent danger for the integrity of the homeland and the unity of the people, the Sawâd-i A‘zam is demanding unanimously from its government, considering the best interest of the beloved homeland, to impose a strict ban on these mâtamî julûs in all public places.

This point of view was not confined to the radicals. The Sunni press generally had little sympathy for the insistence of the Shias to take out their ‘azâdârî processions regardless of the feelings of the majority. Commenting on the ‘Âshûrâ’ riots a few days after, the daily Hilâl-i Pâkistân (Lahore) wrote on 13 August 1957:

“… if the problem was only to deal with some mischievous elements, then police bullets and exemplary punishments by the courts would be enough. But the real question is concerning the situation and background which opens a door for the mischief-makers.According to a general impression, the mâtamî julûs of the Shias are reflecting an idolatrous (mushrikâna) mentality. Chest-beating, injuring oneself with knifes and chains and passing in front of the houses with adorned processions can never give an example for the Islamic society.378 This is giving ridicule instead of honour to the great men [of religion] …”

 

We do not know whether the Shia mazhab gives room for such ceremonies. Surely the Shia mujtahids will oppose such superstitions.379 But if they consider them the essence of their religion, then for maintaining public order the government must impose a strict ban on them in public places. For practising the tenets of one’s religion, is it necessary to display them on public roads, or cannot all this be done in the Shia places of worship? And if the influential Shias consider these bid‘atî processions the essence of their religion, why must the government prevent all Muslims from leaving their houses during Muharram …?

 

Such all-out assaults on their ‘azâdârî traditions called for a strong response from Shias, many of whom perceived these ceremonies as the most powerful means to preserve and strengthen their communal identity. Thus, the ITHS and the APSC closed ranks for some time, forming a “Shia Defence Committee” and organising jointly an All-Pakistan Shia Convention in Lahore in December 1957.381 A more lasting effect was achieved by efforts of many Shia ‘ulamâ’ and intellectuals to prove that ‘azâdârî had a centurieslong tradition in the subcontinent and could by no means been dubbed as an “un-Islamic innovation” (bid‘a). Pakistani and Indian Shia authors wrote

a number of books and articles on the history of ‘azâdârî in the following years.382 The Shia media would argue—apparently with much justification— that for decades, or even centuries, their ‘azâdârî processions had not been regarded offensive by Sunnis in most places; rather Sunnis would have enthusiastically taken part in the Muharram rituals until the preachers of

the TAS had stirred up anti-Shia passions among them.

Such arguments proved fruitful to some extent in the long run, but had little effect immediately. In September 1957, Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari staged a new ploy by proclaiming the 9 Rabî‘ I. (falling on 4 October that year) the birthday of the Caliph ‘Umar.384 This created problems, because Shias were

commemorating the death of the murderers of their Imam Husain, ‘Umar Ibn Sa‘d and Shimr, on that same day. In one village of the Jhang District, Hassu Bulail, there was a tradition of burning effigies of these two historic villains on 9 Rabî‘ I. Promptly the rumour was spread, that Shias had burnt effigies of the Caliph ‘Umar in Hassu Bulail, and the TAS organised protest demonstrations in Lahore and other towns of the Punjab.385 The affair was amply exploited throughout the following months with a view to ruin the chances of Shia candidates in general elections which were scheduled to take place in 1958.386 In this connection, Khwaja Muhammad Qamar ud-Din Sialvi, sajjâda-nishîn of Sial Sharif (Jhang Dist.) and an influential member of the JUP,387 issued the following fatwâ against Shias in December 1957: You will know that the Shia sect is not believing (kâfir hai) in the Koran, the hadîth and the holy consensus (ijmâ‘) of the umma. It is absolutely forbidden to

sit together or eat and drink with them. Therefore, prevent as far as possible this wicked sect from entering your towns and areas, otherwise you will invite the wrath of God. Mind my advice.388

Such a blatant fatwâ from a prominent Barelvi religious leader pronouncing takfîr on Shias was quite extraordinary, but brought no legal consequences for its author. Meanwhile, sectarian tensions between Barelvis and Deobandis had also reached a climax in 1957–8, leading to violence and

occasional murders between these two Sunni groups.389 When the alleged date of the “birthday of the Caliph ‘Umar” approached in 1958, Barelvi ‘ulamâ’ were asking their Deobandi colleagues why they were supporting such a day of commemoration while at the same time they were strongly

opposed to the festivities on the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (Mîlâd an-Nabîy) and the ‘urs celebration days for Muslim saints.

In March 1958 the APSC President Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash became Chief Minister of West Pakistan.391 While he had always sought moderation and consensus with Sunnis when promoting Shia interests, Qizilbash was also the sponsor of the largest ‘azâdârî procession in

Pakistan, keeping alive a hundred-year-old tradition of his family.  But his steps being closely watched by radical Sunnis, he could not allow himself

to concede any change of the status quo regarding ‘azâdârî. During a meeting with D.C.s and high-ranking police officers in April 1958, he announced that no new licences for Muharram processions would be issued that year.393 This was interpreted as “an admission that ‘azâdârî processions

are the cause of riots” by the TAS, which repeated its demand for a general ban on them.394 Qizilbash also announced “strict measures” against people spreading sectarian hatred at the same April meeting, and shortly after ordered the arrest of the Shia preacher Khadim Husain from Gojra

(Lyallpur Dist.) for alleged abuses against the first Caliph.395 Yet no steps against the TAS demagogues were taken. For example, Khalid Mahmud called on the Shias with impunity either to give up their mazhab or leave the country for Iran at the annual session of the Deobandi Jâmi‘at

Ashrafîya in Lahore on 29 April.396 During a TAS convention in Bhakkar on 23–25 May, Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari exhorted the audience to become ghâzîs and mujâhids in defence of Sunni sanctities. Shortly after in the same town a Shia preacher (S. Agha Muhsin) was stabbed to death on the road by a

Sunni zealot because he had quoted a hadîth from the Prophet exalting the status of Ali Ibn Abi Talib among the sahâba. The killer had then surrendered himself to the police and offered a prayer of thanksgiving.

However, the Qizilbash government did take sufficient precautions against a new wave of violence during Muharram 1378H (18 July–16 August 1958). A meeting of Shia and Sunni ‘ulamâ’ and leaders was convened in the Civil Secretariat Lahore on 16 May to discuss the main controversial issues, including the alleged abuse and insulting of the sahâba by Shias.398 Additional sessions were chaired by Qizilbash himself on 9 and 16 July,and the month of Muharram passed without major incidents.400 After that relative success, Qizilbash appointed a new “Muslim Unity Board”, which

held its first meeting on 18 August and formed three subcommittees.

 

Before another session scheduled on 9 October could be held, the proclamation of martial law on 7 October 1958 created a completely new situation, including an effective clamp-down on sectarian propaganda for some time. Five years later, however, the Shia-Sunni conflict about ‘azâdârî

would resurface more violently than before.

 

The demand for “reserved seats” The climax of the campaign against ‘azâdârî in Muharram 1377H (August 1957) had somewhat increased government attention to the sectarian problem,

but it could not intimidate most activists of the Shia organisations. The ITHS leaders responded to the challenge with a hardening of their own positions and new political demands, joined by a number of individual members of the APSC. Thus, for the first time since the failure of the All-Pakistan Shia Board in 1952 the two large Shia organisations came close to forming a common front or even merging with each other in the winter of 1957–58.

 

The new upsurge of Shia communal mobilisation was helped by preparations for what should have become the first countrywide parliamentary elections in Pakistan (in application of the 1956 constitution), scheduled to be held in 1958.404 As had been the case during the Punjab provincial elections of March 1951, blatant sectarian propaganda against Shia candidates

started already in the fall of 1957 in spite of an official ban.405 Thus not only

Shia religious ceremonies were facing strong pressure, but also Shia political representation in Pakistan seemed to be at stake. Under these circumstances an “All-Parties Shia Convention” was held in Lahore on 14–15 December 1957 and attended by many leading members of both the

ITHS and the APSC.

 

During the two sessions of the first day of the convention, plans to merge ITHS and APSC were supported by all speakers, including APSC stalwarts like Sha’iq Ambalvi and Sadiq Ali ‘Irfani, and a twenty-member commission chaired by Malik Fath Sher of Jhamat was formed for that purpose.407

‘Irfani complained about “many useless meetings with hundreds of resolutions passed” during the last ten years, and that Shia ministers and members of assemblies had never represented their qaum; what was needed were “true spokesmen for the Shias”.408 On the second day of the convention (15 December), both S. Muhammad Ali Shamsi (ITHS) and S. Nâdir Ali Rizvi (APSC) tabled resolutions demanding “reservation of seats” for Shias at parliamentary elections. Although a number of delegates spoke out against that demand,409 the supporters had no difficulty arousing the passions of a large majority in favour of the resolution. Major (retd.) S. Mubarak Ali Shah—who would be elected chairman of the ITHS four years later—pleaded for the postponement of a decision on the matter because leaders like Qizilbash, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Col. (retd.) S. ‘Abid Husain were absent. He was reminded by S. Nâdir Ali that all Shias had been invited to the convention, “but our notables and powerful people are in no need of the qaum and do not consider any Shia meeting necessary”.

 

When Malik Fath Sher warned that only very few Shias would make it to the parliament if such a resolution was adopted, Sha’iq Ambalvi argued that Shias could win twenty to twenty-two seats in the National Assembly theoretically, but since they were faced with poisonous sectarian propaganda throughout the country, hardly two to four Shia candidates stood a chance to get elected.410 Finally a resolution was passed which, after giving a lengthy account of injustices done to Shias and indifference of the government to their plight, stated:

 

… the neglect of duty on the side of the government has obliged the Shia sect to define its position for the sake of protection of its life and property and its religious slogans. Moreover, mischievous elements have made all preparations for suppressing our religious slogans and for completely defeating Shia candidates in the forthcoming elections. Thus, there is no other remedy for the religious and political protection of the Shias but demanding reservation of seats.411

With this new demand, the said Shia leaders had departed from a line pursued since the foundation of Pakistan. During all previous meetings of the ITHS and the APSC, only “adequate” and “effective” representation of Shias in parliaments and other institutions of the state had been demanded.

 

Such reluctance of Pakistani Shia activists to struggle for any form of “political confessionalism” on the Lebanese model could partly be explained by the strong negative reactions of the Sunni majority to the demand for “separate representation” tabled by Husainbhai Lalji in 1945.

 

Another important reason had been the negative attitude of the Shia political elite (mainly the landlords) towards such a demand.

 

Already in the pre-partition years, the Shia notables—then fairly well represented in the parliament of the Punjab—had been criticised for lacking interest in the defence of Shia rights and for always seeking to please their Sunni voters instead. This state of affairs remained much the same

after 1947, when it became more difficult for Shia candidates to get elected. Shias won only a few of the eighty-five seats in the December 1951 provincial elections of the NWFP and of the 111 seats in Sindh in May 1953.

 

They had only three representatives in the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (dissolved in 1954)416 and only one representative in the twentyfive- member “Basic Principles Committee”.417 Shias had still won twentytwo of the 197 Punjab provincial seats in 1951,418 but when a West Pakistan Assembly was formed in January 1956 through a procedure of selection

from the existing provincial assemblies, only twenty of its 227 members

were Shias.

 

The demand for “reserved seats” reflected many Shias’ loss of patience with the traditional political leadership of their sect as much as with the attitude of subsequent governments towards the sectarian problem. Criticism of the “opportunist Shia leaders” had been fairly common in Razâkâr since the 1940s, but now even Asad, the organ of the conservative APSC, joined in

such complaints. In an editorial of that weekly on 18 January 1958 titled “Our ten-year-long failures and their reason” it was stated:

 

During the ten-year-long era of Pakistan the TAS and its allied groups have so much poisoned the atmosphere against Shias that today their lives, property and honour is no longer safe. Shia journals and poor Shia activists420 have many times brought the destructive activities of these mischievous elements to the attention of the Shia men in power, but [action upon] our warnings was made

sacrifice to political interests … if any Shia activist comes to the court of leadership (sic) of a powerful Shia person to present any Shia matter, he will be granted an audience only after waiting three hours. Then he will be sent off after one minute with the promise: “Very well, we will talk about it” or “we will study it”. But if a third-class political worker or anyone who can bring some votes comes to him, our Shia leader will receive him at the doorstep and will sit and laugh with him for hours. On most occasions a shia minister who sees a Shia activist approaching him from far will say: “this plague is coming”, or, if he is in a bad mood: “I did not win through Shia votes, therefore I am not a Shia minister” …

 

By late 1957 many activists of both the ITHS and the APSC had come to the conclusion that only reserved seats for Shias in the assemblies could bring about genuine Shia representatives who would make a stand for the defence of Shia rights if needed. It is noteworthy that Resolution No. 1 of

the 1957 Lahore Convention did not demand “separate representation” for Shias throughout the country (as Husainbhai Lalji had done in 1945), but the designation of certain constituencies where only Shia candidates would be allowed to run. The same had been granted to muhâjirs during the provincial elections of the Punjab and Sindh in 1951 and 1953. The demand did

not yet include any specification of the number and location of such “Shia constituencies”.

 

Nevertheless, it was considered premature and inopportune even by some ITHS members present at the Lahore Convention. In the following weeks, more statements from prominent Shias against the demand for “reserved seats” followed, most of which were published in the Sunni press. Among the opponents were Justice S. Jamil Husain Rizvi, Secretary-General of the ITHS since 1956,422 and S. Hadi Ali Shah Bukhari, Vice-Chairman of the APSC.423 The arguments brought forward against the demand by Shias themselves were summed up in Razâkâr as follows: 1) It would be a “deathly poison” for the Shias; 2) it was unconstitutional and against the national interest; 3) it would ignite sectarian hatred; 4) it was unjust and detrimental to all Muslims; 5) if that demand of the Shias was accepted, other Muslim sects would follow suit with similar demands; 6) it would not

win approval by the APSC.

 

Needless to say, no voice in favour of reserved seats for Shias in the assemblies was heard from any Sunni government official or political leader. The TAS, for its part, by early 1958 had invented a new election stunt, exhorting Sunnis not to vote for any Shia candidate unless he would give a written promise to back a bill for the “protection of the honour of the sahâba” in parliament.425 Even the Shia supporters of reserved seats had no illusions that it would take “unity, organisation, hard work and sacrifices” to get such a demand accepted by any government,426 but for the first time in six years serious attempts were made to bring about the needed unity of the Shia organisations.

On 16 March 1958 simultaneous sessions of the Working Committees of the ITHS and the APSC were held in Lahore. The former, chaired by Hafiz Kifayat Husain and held in the house of S. Jamil Husain Rizvi, arrived at a majority decision to support both important resolutions of the All-Pakistan Shia Convention of December 1957, namely the merger of ITHS and APSC and the demand for reserved seats. The fifty delegates present then proceeded to Karbalâ’-i Gâme Shâh for a scheduled joint meeting with the APSC representatives, but the latter did not show up that afternoon.427 At

the session of the APSC Working Committee on the same day Sha’iq Ambalvi hat not only spoken strongly in favour of the December 1957 resolutions, but had also for the first time vented his frustration about the APSC President Qizilbash, whom he accused of having lost interest in Shia

communal affairs since some time.428 Qizilbash, who had become minister in the Federal Government some months before, partially admitted the charge, excusing himself with his numerous other obligations.429 He also admitted that sectarian tensions in Pakistan had reached a level, which would make it difficult for Shia candidates to win elections and did not

exclude the possibility that he himself would have to support the demand for reserved seats, too. For the time being, however, he did not want to take a decision on the matter, because “he did not yet have time to study the two resolutions”.430 Since opinions within the APSC Working Committee were also almost equally divided between supporters and opponents of reserved seats, no decision could be reached on that day and the joint meeting with

the ITHS was cancelled.

 

Qizilbash had offered to discuss the question with APSC Council members in the following days, but his appointment to the position of Chief Minister of West Pakistan two days later (18 March 1958), changed the situation. Naturally, he could no longer be expected to act as a spokesman of special Shia demands. Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, then acting Secretary-General of the ITHS, even saw greater dangers for the Shias with one of their sects serving as chief minister, because fanatical mullahs would brand the spectre of a “Shia state” in Pakistan.433 In any case, both the demand for

reserved seats and projects for merging the ITHS and the APSC withered away in the following months, long before the political scene in Pakistan

changed completely in October 1958.

In the following decade of martial law and Ayub Khan’s “guided democracy”, the demand for reserved seats was completely discarded by the Shia organisations in favour of the former slogan of “adequate representation”. Even the latter demand was only rarely articulated by the new Shia movement of S. Muhammad Dihlavi from 1964 to 1968, which took great pains to portray Shia demands as “entirely religious”.434 Attempts to create a genuine Shia political representation in Pakistan were resumed only in 1969.

 

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