The dialectics in which Deobandis were playing antithesis to the exponents of local Islam were articulated through saint and shrine symbolism. In this connection the website of Khairul Madaris makes interesting reading:

 

Geographically, Multan is situated in the heart of Pakistan and possesses a great historical significance. But the people of not only Multan as a seat of learning, but of the whole southern Punjab were in the past decades, a prey to general ignorance and innovatory rituals practiced in the name of Islam. Under these circumstances, the new Khair-ul-Madaris at Multan proved to be a light house in a stormy night whose light began to spread not only through Punjab but also to the recesses of the whole Islamic world (Retrieved from http://www.khairulmadaris.com.pk/e-branches. htm.).

 

It was quite obvious that not only Multan but most of south Punjab was awash with shrines as the sites of devotional practices, which Deobandi puritanism was quite determined to wipe out. This may be one of the important factors in the spread of Deobandi seminaries in overwhelming number towards the south. Seminaries in southern Punjab were instru- mental in paving the way for Deobandi Islam to displace the syncretic ethos reflected in the local version of Islam. In addition, they played a vital role in turning the region into the biggest recruiting ground for the jihadi lashkars (militiamen) operating in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Ayesha Siddiqua Agha is spot on when she says, “Bahawalpur is one of the few districts which have contributed as much to Jihad as some districts in the frontier district” (Agha 2006). Similarly, while identifying the causes of the mushroom growth of the madaris in divisions such as Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan and Bahawalpur, Jamal Malik (1996) contends:

 

As their infrastructure is poor, there are few important industries and less urbanization; in short, they do not have a high level of development. They are however more integrated in their traditional systems of social order and social security and thus are possibly more cohesive than “modern areas”. These divisions are marked by large landed properties and a high number of small farmers or landless peasants (p. 185).

 

With so little allocation of funds on human resource development, alongside overlooking the social and economic disparity in the south- ern areas, the ruling elite helped to create a conducive environment for madaris to proliferate. More alarming is the growing militancy among the madara graduates. The SSP, the LeJ and the HA have had opera- tional bases in the south. Stalwarts such as Masud Azahar and Abdul Rashid Ghazi (naib khateeb (junior cleric) at Lal Masjid, who was killed in July 2007 by law-enforcement agencies) hailed from Bahawalpur and Rajanpur, respectively.

 

 

Although many scholars consider the Afghan Jihad as a catalyst in engendering militancy, along with the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), the historical context in which the phenomenon of mili- tancy grew, and later on gathered momentum, has not been unravelled. While studying Deobandi militancy, reference should be made to couple of watershed points that galvanized Deobandi activism in Pakistan. First, the anti-Qadiani movement was launched in 1953, Ahrar in the garb of Majlis-i-Tahafuz-i-Khatm-i-Nubuwwat (established in 1949) being the vanguard of the whole episode that resulted in the imposition of martial law in Lahore. The protest movement—Rast Iqdam (direct action) was quelled through a military action under the command of General Azam Khan. Deobandi activism, however, was stemmed for two decades. The anti-Ahmadi impulse nevertheless remained alive and smouldering beneath the surface and ignited again in 1974 in the wake of the Rabwa incident (Kamran 2015). The Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s regime through an amendment to the 1973 Constitution, which appeared to work as a shot in the arm for the Deobandi leadership. The successful finale of the anti-Ahmadi movement had a lasting impact on Deobandis, who found encouragement and held on to their extremist views and militant agenda. Later on, the new Deobandi leadership (e.g., Haq Nawaz Jhangvi and Manzoor Ahmed Chinioti) founded organiza- tions that were avowedly sectarian and militant in nature. The role of the Afghan Jihad in providing the necessary wherewithal and motivation to such organizations can also not be refuted (Ahmed 2004).

The first of these organizations was the SSP, which was dedicated exclusively to fighting shi’ism, which it considered to be non-Muslim because of members’ irreverence towards the companions of the Prophet (Kamran 2009; Abbas 2002). The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the mobiliza- tion of the Shia community in Pakistan provided the basic motive to Haq Nawaz Jhangvi and his associates to form the SSP. The Afghan Jihad in the 1980s provided a conducive environment for the organization’s growth and it went from strength to strength. According to many sources, Saudi Arabia had been the main sponsor of the sectarian organization. The assassination of its founder, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, in February 1990 led to a string of murders and random attacks against Shias, including many Iranian officials living in Pakistan.12 Most of the SSP’s top leadership were assassinated (i.e., Zia-ur-Rahman Farooqi, Isar-ul-Qasmi and Azam Tariq). The organization also sent armed volunteers to help the Taliban in Afghanistan from 1998 onwards.

 

The LeJ was a splinter group of the SSP comprising more radical Deobandis (Kamran 2009). The LeJ was founded in 1994 by Raiz Basra, a veteran of the War in Afghanistan and a close associate of Haq Nawaz Jhnagvi, Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq. All three died an unnatural death. While alive they gave the law-enforcement agencies an extremely hard time. The LeJ targeted Shia leaders, intellectuals and professionals. Based in Kabul until the fall of the city in November 2001, it was accused by the Government of Pakistan of plotting an attack on the then prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, in 1999. It had been a nemesis for the Hazara community in Baluchistan simply because it adheres to Shia faith. Malik Ishaq mas- terminded the terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore in 2009. In addition, he was responsible for scores of assassinations and targeted killings. On July 29, 2015, he was killed in Muzzaffargarh when he tried to escaped from police custody.

In 1991, Fazal ur Rahman Khalil (a Pushtun) and Masud Azher, a young Pakistani cleric from Bahawalpur, established Harkat-ul-Ansar (HA) by merging Harkat-ul-Mujahadeen and Harkat-ul-Jihad. The outfit was joined by many Pakistani volunteers (especially from Punjab) who went to Afghanistan to support the mujahideen. Later on its attention was switched to Kashmir. A former US intelligence officer, Julie Sirrs, carried out a survey in 2000 which revealed that the “foreigners captured by mili- tary commander Masud in north east Afghanistan shows that 39 percent of the 113 prisoners were affiliated with Harkat-ul-Ansar” (Sirrs 2001). In October 1997 the US State Department declared it a terrorist organiza- tion, so it changed its name to the HM.

The JM is another Deobandi militant organization which is a brainchild of Maulana Masud Azhar. In 1994, Masud Azhar was jailed for his mili- tant activities in Indian-held Kashmir. On December 24, 1999, a plane from an Indian airline was hijacked and brought to Qandhar. The hijacker obtained the release of Masud Azhar. He remained under the protection of the Taliban for some time and then returned to Pakistan and founded the JM in Islamabad (Lal Masjid) in February 2000. Many members of the Harkat-ul-Mujahidin and of the SSP are presumed to have joined the JM for ethnic reasons. Punjabis sided with Masud Azhar while Pushtuns stayed with Fazal-ur-Rehman Khalil. Oliver Roy (n.d) attributes the pat- tern of suicide attacks to the JM. In December 2000 a young Muslim from Birmingham, Muhammad Bilal, launched a suicide attack on the Indian army in Srinager, the first incident of its kind (retrieved from Metcalf 2004, pp. 236–64).

Religious intolerance was markedly exacerbated with the introduction of the Blasphemy Law in 1982 by Zia ul Haq. Until then, Section 295   A provided protection for the religious feelings of all the communities irrespective of their religious affiliation, and the perpetrator was to be punished with ten years in prison or a fine. Zia enforced Ordinance XX and made 295 B part of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) in 1982. In 1986 he inserted 295 C in the PPC, which brought minorities to a position  of unprecedented invulnerability, particularly the Ahmedhi community, which was particularly excluded from the social mainstream. However, along with the Ahmadis, Muslims and Christians also fell victim to the Blasphemy Law, which was used mostly with malicious/ulterior motives. Many of the allegations were brought either to favour a business transac- tion or to settle personal scores (Gabriel 2007). The law has been a social bane to Pakistan, which cannot repeal simply because of the enormous pressure exerted on the state by the religious right and Deobandis, which, as described above, are the most zealous supports of that law.

 

CONCLUSION

The linear trajectory of this narrative, while mapping the growth of the Deobandi sect in Punjab, must not obscure the primacy of pirs in the con- temporary sociopolitical setting of the province. Undoubtedly, the maulvi and madrasa nexus has expanded exponentially over the years at the expense of both saint and shrine, and the spiritual excellence that they epitomized. Nevertheless, saint and shrine have sustained their supremacy at least in the rural areas of the Punjab. Historically, saints of Punjab fitted well into the client–patron network of the colonial rulers, a tradition that continued undeterred until now. Conversely, Deobandi maulvis and madaris have been clamouring for sharia to be promulgated from the very outset. The success of the anti-Qadiani movement in the 1970s, Zia’s bid to legitimize his military rule, the Afghan Jihad and the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) contributed a great deal in the Deobandi upsurge. US and Saudi aid changed the class character of Deobandi exponents. It should be reiter- ated here that the Deobandi movement represented the lower-middle and lower classes particularly in Punjab. However, Deobandi groups became more militant and markedly sectarian, frequently challenging the writ of the state in the 1990s. Recently, the Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafza incident in Islamabad, and the way in which the Ghazi brothers exhorted the gov- ernment to implement sharia, typify religious extremism.

Defiance towards the state, the spiralling of sectarian hatred and suicide bombing are tactics deployed by Deobandi militants that have substan- tially unhinged the state apparatus in Pakistan. One explanation for the proliferation of Deobandis in South Punjab is the region’s feudal character. Having no alternative ideology such as Marxism or liberalism, or even the language symbols which may challenge the feudal stranglehold, Deobandi (or sectarian) militancy remains one of the few ways to counter it. Hence, Deobandi denomination was a roaring success in the districts, such as Bahawalpur and Rahim Yar Khan. The quantum of autonomy that the madaris have enjoyed for the last 25 years makes it increasingly difficult for the Pakistani state to establish its own writ. Even proposals for curriculum reforms and the registration of madaris are defied vigorously.

 

Notes:

 

1.Haq Nawaz belonged to Mauza Chela Thana Massan tehsil (sub-district) and Jhang District. He was born in 1952 and hailed from the Sipra clan with a very small land holding. His father, Wali Muhammad, was a known khojji (tracker / spotter) of the area. Haq Nawaz could not go beyond fourth grade in school. He was then sent to Hafiz Jan Muhammad to learn the Qur’an by heart, which he did in two years. Hafiz Jan Muhammad persuaded him to go to Masjid Shiekhan Wali in Abdul Hakim (currently in Khanewal District). There he learnt the art of recita- tion from Qari Taj Muhammad and also acquired a knowledge of gram- mar. Then he spent five years at Darul Ulum, Kabirwalla, and was greatly influenced by Maulana Manzur Ahmed, who was a famous Deobandi scholar of the area. Lastly, he went to Khair ul Madariss, Multan, to learn the ahadith. He remained there for seven years. Then he had a brief stint as imam (prayer leader in a mosque) at Toba Tek Singh. He came to Jhang in 1973 as a khateeb of Masid Mohalla Piplianwalla. Interview from Haq Nawaz’ s elder brother, Mehr Sher Muhammad, and his cousin, Hafiz Muhammad Nawaz, Mauza Chela, Jhang (Kamran 2009).

………

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